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Abstract
Background: Leading transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) began to expand their operations in Latin America
in the 1960s. This included legally exporting their cigarettes to Paraguay during the 1960s which, in turn, were
illegally re-exported to Argentina and Brazil. By the 1990s, competition between BAT and PMI for this lucrative illicit
market, focusing on low-priced brands, prompted manufacturing in Paraguay. Paraguayan manufacturing rapidly
grew after the introduction of a new cigarette export tax in Brazil in 1999.
Methods: We systematically searched Truth Tobacco Industry Documents (TTID) to understand the activities and
strategies of leading TTCs in Paraguay and subregion over time. We applied the analytical framework of Lee and
Eckhardt (2017) to understand Tabesa’s global business strategy. We searched the websites of TTCs and Tabesa
for activities since the mid 2000s to understand how the companies publicly describe these strategies. We used
the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) as an independent source to crosscheck
statements by Tabesa executives about export markets. We contextualized and triangulated our findings with 42
key informant interviews.
Results: Tabesa became the largest cigarette manufacturer in Paraguay, and one of the largest companies in the
country, through complicity in the illicit trade. Enabled by market conditions created by leading TTCs, and a
permissive regulatory environment in Paraguay, evidence suggests Tabesa had become a major source of illicit
cigarettes across Latin America and beyond by the late 2000s. Although Brazil continues to account for the bulk
of Tabesa’s revenues, findings suggest that the company is aspiring to compete with TTCs in markets worldwide
through legal and illegal sales.
Conclusion: There is a need for fuller understanding of the risks to global tobacco control from local companies aspiring
to compete with TTCs. The rise of Tabesa is part of the changing nature of the illicit trade in tobacco products which
must be taken into account in implementing the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) and its Protocol to
Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products. Potential conflicts of interest concerning Tabesa illustrate the importance of
FCTC Article 5.3 on industry interference. There is also an urgent need to address the lack of independent and rigorous
data on the illicit tobacco trade in the region.
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Resumen
Introducción: las principales empresas tabacaleras transnacionales (TTCs por sus siglas en inglés) comenzaron la
expansión de sus operaciones en América Latina durante la década de 1960. Esto incluyó la exportación legal de
cigarrillos a Paraguay durante los años sesenta, para ser posteriormente reexportados ilegalmente a Brasil y
Argentina. En la década de los noventa, la competencia entre BAT y PMI por este lucrativo mercado ilícito, centrado
en marcas de bajo precio, incentivó la producción en Paraguay. La producción paraguaya creció rápidamente
después de la introducción de un nuevo impuesto a las exportaciones de cigarrillos en 1999 en Brasil.
Métodos: Efectuamos búsquedas sistemáticas en los documentos de la industria tabaquera (Truth Tobacco Industry
Documents (TTID)) para entender las actividades y estrategias de las principales TTCs en Paraguay y en la subregión
a través del tiempo. Utilizamos el marco analítico de Lee y Eckhardt (2017) para analizar la estrategia comercial
global de Tabesa. Examinamos las páginas web de las TTCs y de Tabesa desde mediados de la década de 2000
para comprender cómo estas empresas describen públicamente sus estrategias. Utilizamos la base de datos
COMTRADE sobre estadísticas de comercio internacional de mercaderías como una fuente independiente para
cotejar con declaraciones de los ejecutivos de Tabesa sobre los mercados de exportación. Contextualizamos y
triangulamos nuestros hallazgos con 42 entrevistas con informantes clave.
Resultados: Tabesa se convirtió en el productor de cigarrillos más grande de Paraguay y en una de las compañías
más grandes del país gracias, en parte, a su complicidad con el comercio ilícito. Facilitado por las condiciones del
mercado creadas por las principales TTCs, así como por un entorno regulatorio permisivo en Paraguay, la evidencia
sugiere que, para fines de los años 2000, Tabesa se había convertido en un importante proveedor de cigarrillos
ilícitos en América Latina y fuera de la región. Aunque el comercio con Brasil sigue representando la mayor parte
de los ingresos de Tabesa, los hallazgos sugieren que la compañía aspira a competir con las TTCs en los mercados
mundiales a través de ventas tanto legales como ilegales.
Conclusión: es necesario lograr una comprensión más completa de los riesgos que representan las compañías
locales que aspiran a competir con las TTCs para el control mundial del tabaquismo. El ascenso de Tabesa es parte
de la naturaleza cambiante del comercio ilícito de productos de tabaco, y debe tenerse en cuenta en la aplicación
del Convenio Marco de la OMS para el Control del Tabaco (CMCT OMS) y su Protocolo para la eliminación del
comercio ilícito de productos de tabaco. Posibles conflictos de interés relativos a Tabesa ilustran la importancia del
Artículo 5.3 del CMCT sobre la interferencia de la industria. También es urgente abordar la falta de datos
independientes y rigurosos sobre el comercio ilícito de tabaco en la región.
Introduction
Since the 1990s, there has been an accelerated restruc-
turing of production and consumption within the to-
bacco industry worldwide, and further concentration of
ownership in the hands of a small number of leading
transnational tobacco companies (TTCs), as part of pro-
cesses of tobacco industry globalization [1]. By 2016,
79.6% of the world cigarette market outside China was
controlled by six TTCs [2]. Public health research to
date has thus focused on the role of these companies in
contributing to the growing rates of tobacco use in many
emerging markets, and the corresponding rise in
tobacco-related disease and death during this period [3].
Far less, however, is known about the business strategies
of tobacco companies that have remained independent
of leading TTCs [2], amid tobacco industry globalization,
and the implications for global tobacco control [4, 5].
This paper examines one of the few remaining inde-
pendent tobacco companies in Latin America, Paraguay’s
Tabacalera del Este (known as Tabesa). Tabesa is owned
by businessman Horacio Cartes, Paraguay's elected
president between 2013 and 2018. When the company
was established in 1994, the Paraguayan company La Ven-
cedora, and leading TTCs British American Tobacco
(BAT) and Philip Morris International (PMI) held 41%,
32%, and 22% of the domestic market share respectively
[6]. As well as being the largest cigarette manufacturer in
the country, today Tabesa is one of only two Latin Ameri-
can tobacco companies exporting to the US market. Build-
ing on our accompanying analysis of the tobacco industry
in Paraguay from the 1960s to the early 2000s, focused on
how the country was used as a major transit hub for illicit
re-export of TTC brands to Brazil and Argentina [7], the
purpose of this paper is to analyse the regional and global
business strategies of Tabesa since the mid 1990s. We ex-
plain how Tabesa has grown to dominate the domestic
market, then became a major regional company, and more
recently expanded into an aspiring TTC, by analysing the
key internal and external factors behind Tabesa’s growth.
This includes the central role played in this growth by the
illicit tobacco trade which the World Health Organization
(WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
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(FCTC) Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products defines as “any practice or conduct prohibited by
law and which relates to production, shipment, receipt,
possession, distribution, sale or purchase including any
practice or conduct intended to facilitate such activity”
(Article 1). The previous complicity of leading TTCs in
the illicit tobacco trade, estimated to account for 9–12%
of cigarette consumption worldwide [8, 9], has been well
documented [10–18]. Far less is known about the role of
non TTCs in the illicit trade. While there have been long-
standing media reports that Tabesa is one of the primary
sources of smuggled cigarettes in Latin America [19–22],
this paper provides the first detailed and scholarly account
of this alleged activity, and how it fits with the company’s
business strategy within the context of tobacco industry
globalization. We conclude by considering the implica-
tions of Tabesa’s growth for implementing the FCTC and
Protocol.
Background
Latin America became an important region for TTC ex-
pansion during the 1960s. Growing concerns about the
accumulating evidence of the adverse health effects of
tobacco use led to the decline in smoking prevalence in
so-called traditional markets such as the US [23]. To
compensate for anticipated declining sales in these mar-
kets, TTCs turned their attention to emerging markets.
In many Latin American countries, market access to many
industrial sectors was tightly controlled by import substitu-
tion policies. Many sectors were nationally-owned and thus
protected – including restrictions on foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and consumer goods imports - limiting the
scope for foreign companies, particularly in the consumer-
goods sector, to operate in these markets [24–26]. In our ac-
companying paper [7], we argue that Paraguay became an
important destination for substantial volumes of legally
exported TTC-manufactured cigarettes which were then il-
legally re-exported to Brazil and Argentina. Paraguay’s role,
as “a staging point for re-exports” [27], enabled TTCs to es-
tablish a strong regional presence and demand for their
brands. Specifically, we identify four phases in the illicit to-
bacco trade involving Paraguay: 1) as a transit hub for smug-
gling BAT and PMI cigarettes from the U.S. into Argentina
and Brazil (from the 1960s to the mid-1970s); 2) BAT and
PMI competing in the north-east of Argentina (1989-1994);
3) BAT and PMI competing in southern and south-eastern
Brazil (mid to late 1990s); and 4) growth in the illicit trade of
Paraguayan manufactured cigarettes (from the mid-1990s).
In short, TTCs had shifted from supplying premium brands
to becoming complicit in the supply of lower-priced, untaxed
cigarettes in Brazil and Argentina via the illicit trade. The
introduction of a 150% cigarette export tax by Brazil in 1999,
to discourage the illegal re-export of Brazilian manufactured
cigarettes back into the country, effectively ended the use of
Paraguay by TTCs as a transit hub. The combined creation
of a substantial market in Brazil and Argentina for
low-priced cigarettes, and the Brazilian export tax, led to a
boom in domestic cigarette production in Paraguay [7].
It is in this context that we seek to understand the rise
of Tabesa from the early 2000s, including its role in the
illicit tobacco trade. Cigarette manufacturer Tabesa is
part of the Grupo Cartes conglomerate built by siblings
Horacio and Sarah Cartes. Tabesa operates alongside
Tabacos del Paraguay (a distribution company created in
1997 and renamed Palermo in August 2016) [28],
Compañía Agrotabacalera del Paraguay (a leaf cultivator
which has supplied Tabesa since 2002), Valla Global
Ventures (supporter of Tabesa’s international expansion
founded in 2002), Tabacos USA (active since Tabesa’s ex-
pansion to the US in 2008), and Cigar Trading and
Habacorp (a cigar business founded in 1999). In 2015,
Tabesa was the country’s largest corporate taxpayer
(around US$45 million) [29, 30].
Ownership and structure of the tobacco industry in
Paraguay is unusual for Latin America. BAT and PMI
have acquired most of the region’s local companies
through mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By 2017 BAT
and PMI controlled 83% of the region’s cigarette market
(43.2% and 39.8% respectively) [31]. In contrast,
Paraguay is one of only three countries, along with
Uruguay (Cía Industrial de Tabacos Monte Paz) [32] and
Bolivia (Cía Industrial de Tabacos CITSA and Bis
Overseas Bolivia SRL) [33], to still have locally-owned
companies with a larger market share than TTCs.
Tabesa accounted for half of Paraguay’s tobacco products
market in 2015 [34–37]. How and why this has come to
be the case, and what this means for global tobacco con-
trol, has been little studied to date.
Methods
To determine what is currently known about the to-
bacco industry in Paraguay, we began by reviewing the
existing English, Spanish and Portuguese language schol-
arly literature published since 1990 using JSTOR and
Google Scholar, with the keywords “Paraguay” combined
with “Tabesa”, “Tabacalera del Este”, “tobacco”, “ciga-
rettes”, and “smuggling” (and related terms). This search
extended to the following subject areas: business, crim-
inology, economics, geography, history, international re-
lations, Latin American studies, political science, public
health, and public policy and administration. A total of
154 relevant scholarly papers were identified. We then
used the same keywords to search the Factiva and Lexis
Nexis databases of media sources. A total of 467 relevant
media articles were identified, dating between 1990
and 2016. We also reviewed industry and business
news sources such as Tobacco Reporter (www.tobac-
coreporter.com), KPMG (www.kpmg.com),
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Euromonitor International (www.euromonitor.com),
Panjiva (www.panjiva.com), and MarketResearch.com.
To understand the strategies of leading TTCs in
Paraguay, we systematically searched internal industry doc-
uments available from the Truth Tobacco Industry Docu-
ment (TTID) collection using English and Spanish
language keywords. We initially used the keywords
“Paraguay” combined using Boolean terms with “Tabesa”,
“Tabacalera del Este,” “Boqueron,” “La Vencedora,” “Taba-
cos USA,” “Tabacos del Paraguay” and “Palermo”, to iden-
tify documents related to the domestic industry. We then
combined “Paraguay” with “DNP” (duty not paid), “transit”
and other known euphemisms for the illicit tobacco trade
[14, 38]. We used the snowball technique to generate add-
itional search terms such as names of individuals, brands
and projects [39]. A total of 1239 documents were identified
and reviewed for relevance to the business strategies of
Tabesa. Given that most TTID documents date from before
the mid 2000s, we consulted other industry sources for
more recent information on company strategies and activ-
ities. We systematically searched the company websites of
Grupo Cartes (http://www.grupocartes.com.py/), Tabacalera
del Este (http://www.tabesa.com.py), Tabacos del Paraguay
(http://www.tabacosdelparaguay.com), Palermo (http://
palermo.com.py), Tabacos USA (http://www.tabacosusa.
com), BAT (www.bat.com.py/) and PMI (https://www.
pmi.com).
It is important to note that accurate measurement of
the illicit tobacco trade worldwide remains difficult given
the nefarious nature of the activity, varying definitions,
limited availability of official and independent data
sources, and unreliability of methods [8, 40]. For ex-
ample, estimates based solely on customs seizures can
be misleading, reflecting increased law enforcement ef-
forts rather than actual changes in illicit trade volumes
[41–43]. In Latin America, we also found that
industry-linked data sources are frequently uncritically
cited by the media, researchers, and even government
officials. However, as well as substantial evidence of
TTC complicity in the illicit trade [10–18], there is
evidence that TTCs have promoted over and/or under-
estimates of the scale of the illicit trade, and its causal
factors, to serve industry interests and undermine
tobacco control measures [44, 45]. In some contexts, the
tobacco industry even provides training to customs and
law enforcement officials on how to detect illicit tobacco
products, notably counterfeits which compete with their
products [46]. Overall, the lack of comprehensive, inde-
pendent and reliable data on the illicit tobacco trade in
Latin America over time has been a major challenge to
analysing and addressing its causes.
To address this problem, we analysed the UN Commod-
ity Trade Statistics Database (UN Comtrade) (http://com-
trade.un.org) for independent data on the legal tobacco
trade. This database “stores standardised official annual
trade statistics reported by countries and reflecting inter-
national merchandise flows detailed by commodity and
partner country with coverage reaching up to 99 percent
of world merchandise trade” [47]. Using data on commod-
ities ‘240220 - Cigarettes; containing tobacco’, we com-
pared reported imports from Paraguay to reported exports
to eleven markets worldwide. The markets were identified
in statements by Tabesa employees in the Paraguayan
media: Aruba, Bulgaria, Curaçao, Mongolia, the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles,1 Romania, Spain,
Switzerland, UAE,2 and US from 2001 to 2016. We used
the conversion rate applied in Iglesias et al. [48] to esti-
mate the number of cigarette sticks from net weight (1 kg
= 956.4 cigarettes). The difference between official exports
and imports is assumed, in this analysis, consistent with
Merriman [44], to be largely composed of illicit trade.
In applying this method, to estimate the illicit tobacco
trade involving Paraguay, we acknowledge that “trade sta-
tistics - as any source of information - are not free of mis-
takes and omissions” [49]. According to the World Bank,
there are four reasons for discrepancies between official
exports and imports: (a) imports are recorded cif (cost in-
surance and freight) while exports are fob (free on board)
which may differ by 10–20% in value; (b) data quality may
vary by country; (c) imports are usually recorded with
greater accuracy because they generate tariff revenues;
and (d) the same good may be recorded in different cat-
egories by the exporter and importer [50]. Despite these
caveats, Merriman notes that “persistent discrepancies be-
tween these amounts - discrepancies that cannot be ex-
plained by other factors - provide an estimate of the
amount of wholesale smuggled tobacco” [51].
To contextualize and triangulate our findings, we
conducted 42 key informant interviews with scholars,
activists, consultants, law enforcement officials and gov-
ernment representatives from the region by telephone
between November 2014 and February 2017, and during
a visit to the region in June 2015. Key informants were
initially identified through the literature review, and then
the snowballing method was used to identify further in-
terviewees. Given the subject matter of this research,
only two interviewees consented to be on the record
(although their contributions do not form part of the
final paper). Two other interviewees agreed to be quoted
anonymously. Where key informants provided consent
to be quoted, compliant with recognized ethics guide-
lines [52, 53], and ethics approval from the Office of
Research Ethics, Simon Fraser University, we cite key in-
formants using generally worded attributions to main-
tain anonymity. The remaining key informants only
consented to speak off the record. Information from
these interviews provided useful background and was
used to triangulate findings derived from other sources.
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The above sources were compiled and triangulated,
thematically and chronologically, to derive a narrative of
Tabesa’s business strategy and activities. To organize this
material, we applied the framework of Lee and Eckhardt
[4] heuristically to structure our analysis of its global
business strategies focused on three questions: (a) what
are the main factors shaping a company’s global business
strategy? (b) what are the specific strategies pursued to
achieve globalisation? and (c) to what extent has the in-
dustry as a whole, or the specific company in question,
globalised to date?
Results
“Replacing the market the multinationals abandoned”:
Internal and external factors shaping Tabesa’s business
strategy
Lee and Eckhardt argue that various internal or external
factors may explain a tobacco firm’s pursuit of
globalization. Internally, a firm may seek: (a) natural re-
sources; (b) markets; (c) improved efficiency; or (d) stra-
tegic assets [4]. Applying this framework, internal
industry documents suggest the motivation for Tabesa’s
expansion beyond Paraguay was primarily as a market
seeker, aiming “to expand the sale of goods and services
beyond the domestic market” [4]. The small size of the
domestic market in Paraguay suggests that it was not
the driver of Tabesa’s growth. Indeed, adult (> 15 years)
smoking prevalence in Paraguay has been relatively low,
and declined from 24% in 1995 [54] to 14.5% in 2011–
2016 [55, 56]. Retail sales of tobacco products in
Paraguay shrank from US$149 million in 2002 to US$62
million in 2016 (in 2016 US$) [57]. In 2013, there were
fewer than 570,000 adult daily smokers among Para-
guay’s 7 million population [58, 59]. As described in our
accompanying paper [7], from the early 2000s, Para-
guayan tobacco manufacturing grew to fill a vacuum in
the illicit supply chain to Brazil and Argentina left by
leading TTCs [7]. Subsequently a downward trend in
adult smoking prevalence in Brazil, from 35% in the late
1980s to 15% in 2008 [60], and Argentina, from 40% in
1999 [54] to 25% in 2016 [56], led Tabesa to seek mar-
kets beyond the subregion. Since the mid 2010s, Tabesa
has sought “to boost exports to the Caribbean and ex-
pand sales to other markets in Asia and Europe” [61].
With company executives believing that “a good deal
may come from anywhere in the world” [62], available
data presented below suggests a rapid diversification by
Tabesa of its markets beyond the subregion.
While internal factors influenced the markets that
Tabesa and other Paraguayan tobacco companies tar-
geted, evidence suggests that two external factors explain
the emergence and growth of these companies: (a) mar-
ket conditions (e.g. degree of openness, competition,
preferential trade and investment agreements); and (b)
regulatory environment (e.g. tobacco control measures,
law enforcement, customs) [4]. First, documents suggest
that leading TTCs created enabling market conditions in
the subregion that channelled legal exports to the illicit
re-export market [63]. Using Paraguay as “a staging
point for re-exports” beginning in the 1960s [7], docu-
ments suggest BAT and PMI established a flourishing
business model that integrated the legal and illegal trade.
From 1989 onwards, the two companies then shifted
their focus to lower-priced brands. The tripling of Para-
guayan manufacturing during 1995–1998 was a direct
response to this new market opportunity. A further
doubling in production from 1999 to 2003, to then fill a
drop in supply from leading TTCs, due to the Brazilian
cigarette export tax of 1998, made Paraguayan compan-
ies direct competitors of TTCs [7]. Documents suggest
Tabesa used the same distribution networks, previously
used to illegally “re-export” TTC brands back into Brazil,
for its own products [64, 65]. According to Tabesa’s
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) José Ortiz, the company
was merely “replacing the market the multinationals aban-
doned”, calling TTCs “the parents and grandparents of the
creature” [translated by the authors] [66]. Ortiz described
subsequent TTC accusations of illegal activity by Tabesa as
“moral hypocrisy” given that “the multinationals in Brazil
and Argentina are the ones who used Paraguay to export
their products so that Brazilians and Argentines would
come to Paraguay and buy our products” [translated by the
authors] [66]. Similarly, Cartes stated,
I want [BATand PMI] to show me what they said when
they exported all their cigarettes back to Argentina [and
Brazil]….The [Paraguayan] Ministry of Finance informed
Brazil when Souza Cruz was exporting 140,000 cases per
month here, much more than we are selling [today]. You
need to see what they said when they were exporting. If
there is a market today, they generated it. If they come
looking for it today, it is because they generated it.
[translated by the authors] [22].
A second external factor in Tabesa’s rapid growth was a
permissive regulatory environment. The so-called “Triple
Frontier” (shared by Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil) has
long been an important transit zone for smuggling given
the presence of multiple border entry points by air, land
and water, along with weak border controls. A 1990 study
of Paraguayan trade found that “contraband accounted for
58% of exports and 31% of imports” [67]. This included a
substantial role in the illicit drug trade. Paraguay is
among the largest cannabis producers in the Western
Hemisphere, and is a transit hub for cocaine en route to
Brazil, Argentina, West Africa, Europe and the Middle
East [68]. With Tabesa’s factory located close to the Iguazú
and Paraná Rivers, and the Friendship Bridge linking
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Ciudad del Este in Paraguay and Foz do Iguaçu in Brazil,
the company has been well positioned geographically to
transport its goods across this border area.
It is in this context, of a substantial and thriving illicit
tobacco trade between Brazil and Paraguay, that in 1999
the Brazilian Ministry of Finance introduced a 150% tax
on cigarette exports to Latin America, in an effort to
stem their tax-free “re-export” back into the country via
illicit channels [48]. As detailed in our accompanying
paper, the new tax led to a sharp decline in Brazilian
cigarette exports to Paraguay and, in turn, a significant
increase in cigarette production in Paraguay for export
[7]. Production rose in volume by a remarkable 2592%
between 2000 and 2010 [69], much of which was report-
edly exported to Brazil and other countries illegally [62,
70, 71]. Overall, documents suggest that the rapid ex-
pansion of Tabesa’s manufacturing capacity was to fill
this void in the supplying of the illicit trade.
“We think globally”: Mimicking selected business
strategies of leading TTCs
Among the different ways that Tabesa could have pursued
“various global markets” [translated by the authors] [72], our
findings suggest three main strategies. First, Tabesa created
new brands (e.g. Rodeo, Eight), manufacturing them domes-
tically, and then exporting them via illicit channels [62].
When this business proved highly successful, and the com-
pany grew rapidly as a result, Tabesa began to “think glo-
bally” about product development [73]: “We developed our
tobacco blends with international characteristics...national
production was adapted to international requirements in
order to compete on quality” [translated by the authors]
[34]. Tabesa has also built “state-of-the-art modern factor-
ies” [70] to produce more cigarettes to this higher stand-
ard that could then compete for new markets abroad.
By the mid 2000s, therefore, Tabesa’s business strategy
had changed. A higher quality and quantity of Tabesa
brands by then were being produced, still largely for the
illicit market, but now not only for the subregion, but for
markets further afield. According to WHO, Paraguay had
emerged as “a top producer of contraband tobacco” [9]. In
2006, Paraguayan companies produced 68 billion cigarettes
which Ramos [74] estimates represented approximately
11% of the world’s total illicit trade. As this was more than
twenty times the amount consumed domestically, law en-
forcement officials estimated that up to 90% of cigarettes
manufactured in Paraguay (worth around US$1 billion)
was being produced for smuggling to other countries [74].
Brazil remained a key destination. As one former law
enforcement official described, it is the focus of “70% of
Tabesa’s activity… Paraguayan factories like Tabesa take
part in smuggling. They know the clients, they facilitate it.
They create companies all over the place and the product
then disappears” [70]. Beyond Brazil, there is evidence that
Free Trade Zones (FTZs) have provided new opportunities
to divert cigarettes to the illicit market given their limited
regulation and customs presence [75]. For example,
Tabesa’s sister company, Valla Global Ventures (VGV), is
described on the Grupo Cartes company website as “a
Society constituted under the laws of the British
Virgin Islands” and “a Trading Company… dedicated
to selling and exporting tobacco products to different
world markets”, focusing on “commercialization and
international intermediation for the sale of cigarettes”
[translated by the authors] [76]. For instance, in 2009
and 2010, VGV imported amounts of cigarettes manufac-
tured by Tabesa to the British Virgin Islands and the
Corozal FTZ in Belize that far exceeded local levels of
consumption [77, 78].
Alongside business strategies reminiscent of leading
TTCs, Tabesa executives have adopted arguments previ-
ously used by TTCs to publicly defend themselves against
accusations of complicity in the illicit trade. For example,
recent media reports suggest criminal organizations such
as Los Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel in Mexico, the Urabe-
ños and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(FARC), and the Red Command and the First Capital
Command (PCC) in Brazil have been involved in the dis-
tribution of illicit Paraguayan cigarettes, using the trade to
launder revenues from trafficking of cocaine, heroin and
methamphetamines [79–81]. Similar to leading TTCs [82],
Tabesa officials have claimed that, after legally selling to dis-
tributors, the company is not responsible for the onward
sale of its products illegally. In a 2009 interview, Ortiz ar-
gued, “We have the function of supplying the market: If
you have a butcher shop and someone likes your ribs, will
you stop selling if you have the meat?... We have no way of
knowing where our cigarettes are smoked, nor is it our
problem” [translated by the authors] [66]. In a 2016 inter-
view on cigarette smuggling in Colombia, Ortiz similarly ar-
gued that “the problem is theirs, they have a tax problem…
[Tabesa] does not owe investigators any explanations about
why cigarettes made by Tabesa were smuggled to
Colombia” [translated by the authors] [83]. According to
Cartes, the problem lies with customs officials in destin-
ation countries: “For me, contraband is a customs problem.
We don’t do any of it; we have a clear conscience. It is the
same as Nestlé. They are not responsible for who sells Nido
milk here” [translated by the authors] [22].
A third way Tabesa has pursued its business strategy has
been to establish a legal presence in the US market. In 1999
the company applied for trademark protection of its
Palermo brand with the US Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) [84]. Tabesa describes the granting of trademark
protection in 2001 as coming after years of “intense negoti-
ations”, and in 2007 “the prestigious certification…to sell
cigarettes in this demanding market” [translated by the au-
thors] [61]. Tabacos USA began selling Palermo in February
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2008. The websites of Grupo Cartes, Tabesa, and Tabacos
USA describe these developments in glowing terms:
One of Tabesa’s products conquered the US market,
where all states had to approve its commercialization
under a regime called the MSA [Master Settlement
Agreement]. This modality is only for companies that
qualify for strict procedures and demanding controls.
The US states gave their approval for Tabesa to sell
cigarettes in that demanding market. In all of Latin
America, only two companies are part of MSA:
Montepaz from Uruguay and Tabacalera del Este
[translated by the authors] [34].
As stated on the Grupo Cartes website by Juan Carlos
López Moreira, head of Tabacos del Paraguay at the time
and a key player in the negotiations: “We worked hard. It
was a long journey. I remember the day they gave us the
certification very well. At 10.15 pm on December 27,
2007, on my birthday, the US attorney called me telling
me that we had been awarded the MSA certification
[translated by the authors]” [85]. The thoroughness of the
certification process is described on the company website:
Months earlier, in Washington, prosecutors had
subjected López Moreira [then CEO of Tabacos del
Paraguay] and Barriocanal [then a senior executive in
the Cartes Group and CEO of Bebidas del Paraguay]
to all sorts of questions about Horacio Cartes’
companies and their trajectory for 8 hours. They had
to back up everything with documents and even
addressed queries about media publications against
them. Even then, they left the files with the
prosecutors for them to investigate everything.
[translated by the authors] [61].
However, evidence suggests this expansion into the US
market has not been to generate profits through
Fig. 1 Tabesa’s market presence by US states. Source: Compiled from state-managed business registration databases for Tabacos USA, Tabesa and
Tabacalera del Este [accessed in February 2017]
Fig. 2 Tabesa total exports and imports, 2011–2016. Source: Compiled
from Departamento Estadistica, Adminstración Sistems SOFIA, Dirección
Nacional de Aduanas [accessed in June 2017]
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American sales. While Grupo Cartes has expressed “sat-
isfaction to know that sales [of Palermo in the US] are
superior to those in Paraguay” [translated by the au-
thors] [61], to date, the US market for Palermo has been
modest. In a 2012 media interview, Moreira indicated
that Tabesa was just “breaking even” [translated by the
authors] in the US, and argued that this left little margin
for alleged money laundering [86]. Data on shipments
from Tabesa between 28 April 2016 and 23 December
2016 show exports of 38,913 kg of cigarettes to the US
(or 37.2 million cigarettes using Iglesias et al. method-
ology [48]), approximately one-thirteenth of its exports
to Aruba (524,179 kg or 501.3 million cigarettes) [87].
Annual revenue of Tabacos USA in 2016 was a relatively
modest US$1.8 million [88]. Although Tabesa’s 2012 re-
port to the US Patent and Trademark Office indicates
that its Palermo “is presently being sold in the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania and in some 25 other states
through its importer and distributor, Tabacos USA” [89],
a comprehensive business search shows that the com-
pany is registered and active in only seven US states
(Fig. 1). This suggests Tabesa has been less financially
successful in the US market than the company claims.
Evidence suggests that, instead of sales, permission to
export to the US market has been more important as a
source of legitimacy for the company and its executives,
and used as a defence against allegations of cigarette
smuggling, money laundering and drug trafficking
[90, 91]. As stated by Cartes in a media interview on the
US government’s investigation of his business operations,
When there are two companies in all of Latin America
that can export to the US, Montepaz from Uruguay and
Tabacalera del Este…I can assure you that the controls
are extraordinarily strict….It was a process of more
than 3 years, because there are 51 [sic] states that have
to authorize you….If we are going to be falsifying
exports to the US with the controls they have in place…
[translated by the authors] [22].
During the 2013 presidential elections, Senator Julio
Velazquez of Paraguay’s Colorado Party similarly evoked
the certification process to defend Cartes in a media
interview: “When it comes to drug trafficking, Horacio
has made it clear what his position is…There’s no con-
crete allegation against him. Horacio has investments in
the US. Do you think the Americans would allow a
narco to bring money into their country?” [92].
How globalized is Tabesa to date?
Officially registered exports by Tabesa have decreased by
89% since 2012 and its registered imports of inputs for
cigarette manufacturing have declined by 40.5% since 2014
[93] (Fig. 2). At first glance, this seems to indicate that
Tabesa’s expansion has stalled. However, close analysis of
Table 1 Tabesa imports of key cigarette components (2015).
Source: Compiled from data provided courtesy of BITQ
Consulting Services Limited, 2015–2016
Cigarette components Tabesa imports
in kgs
Equivalent in bn
cigarette sticks
Acetate tow 2,759,406.90 24.88
Cigarette paper 1,322,541.10 35.69
Filter paper 319,549.40 25.30
Tipping paper 847,793.00 36.24
Triacetin 246,800.00 28.19
Fig. 3 The continued growth of Paraguayan cigarette production (in billion cigarette sticks). Source: Estimated from UN Comtrade data and
methodology used in Iglesias et al. [48]
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available additional data suggests otherwise. Tabesa has
remained Paraguay’s largest corporate taxpayer, cigarette
manufacturer and leader in domestic sales, outperforming
BAT and PMI [29, 37, 30]. Tabesa’s Kentucky is the bestsel-
ling brand in the country [94]. In 2015, the company
imported approximately 2.8 million kilograms of acetate
tow, 1.3 million kilograms of cigarette paper, 320,000 kg of
filter paper, 875,000 kg of tipping paper, and 247,000 kg of
triacetin, enough to produce between 25 and 36 billion
sticks (Table 1). Given that Paraguay’s domestic consump-
tion is around 4 billion sticks, and official legal exports are
2.1 billion cigarettes [95], this suggests 19–30 billion ciga-
rettes manufactured by Tabesa may be entering the illicit
market annually. Additional data compiled by the authors,
using the estimation methodology based on tobacco leaf
imports described in our accompanying paper [7], sug-
gests that Paraguayan cigarette manufacturing continues
to grow (Fig. 3). UN Comtrade data, showing that
Paraguayan imports of cigarette paper (HS 4813) and cel-
lulose acetate (HS 391211 and 391,212) - two key cigarette
inputs – respectively increased by 40% and 52% between
2012 and 2017, suggests the same trend.
There is also additional evidence that large volumes of
cigarettes continue to be exported to Brazil illegally from
Paraguay. According to a law enforcement official, Brazil
accounts for 70% of Tabesa’s profit [70]. Despite Tabesa
having no officially reported cigarette exports to Brazil,
Brazilian customs authorities seized 341.1 million packs of
cigarettes coming from Paraguay between 2010 and 2013
[96]. Brazil’s Department of Federal Revenue reported that,
of the 70 Paraguayan brands smuggled into Brazil, five were
manufactured by Tabesa and accounted for 49% of total
seizures [97]. Similarly, Iglesias et al. found that “the total
proportion of illicit cigarette consumption and the total
amount of yearly illicit manufactured consumption [in
Brazil] increased from 16.6% to 31.1% and from 13.0
to 24.3 billion of units, respectively” between 2008
and 2013 [98].
Other sources report that Tabesa brands have been il-
legally exported to other Latin American countries. Ramos
reported in 2009 that Rodeo and Eight were the most fre-
quently confiscated in Argentina, with around 45% of cig-
arettes smuggled into the country coming from Tabesa
[74]. In November 2014, the Colombian newspaper El
Espectador published a detailed account of the alleged
contraband routes for tobacco in South America,
highlighting Paraguay as the region’s key production hub
and Tabesa as its main manufacturer [99]. In Colombia,
Tabesa is identified as the main source of illicit cigarettes
seized in 2014, with the brand Ibiza comprising “10% of
the domestic market (when considering both legal and il-
legal markets)” [translated by the authors] [99]. In 2014, it
was reported that Tabesa produced six of the top selling
contraband cigarette brands found in Mexico [100]. Given
the above, journalist Mauri König and colleagues nick-
named Horacio Cartes, elected Paraguay's president in
2013, “The Tobacco Lord”, and called cigarette smuggling
a “state business” in Paraguay [101].
Finally, our findings suggest that Tabesa’s business
strategy, hitherto focused on the regional illicit tobacco
trade, has begun to explore markets beyond Latin Amer-
ica. Comprehensive official data on Paraguayan compan-
ies’ exports of tobacco products remains unavailable,
and Tabesa’s website does not list all of its export mar-
kets. However, in a 2011 media interview, Juan Carlos
López Moreira (then CEO of Tabacos del Paraguay and
Tabacos USA) disclosed, “We export to Switzerland,
Mongolia, Romania, Bulgaria, the Canary Islands, Hol-
land.” [translated by the authors] [86]. In an interview in
2012, Cartes mentions Switzerland, the US and Aruba as
export markets, along with “some Arab countries”
[translated by the authors] [22]. In 2014, Ortiz named
Curaçao, in addition to the US and Aruba, among “other
countries” [translated by the authors] [102].
Using these media interviews as a starting point, to
search the UN Comtrade Database for officially reported
cigarette exports by Paraguay, we found significant dis-
crepancies between reported exports and imports of cig-
arettes, far greater than can be explained by the
methodological challenges noted in the Methods section
of this paper. For 10 of 11 territorial entities, official ex-
ports were greater than imports. Between 2001 and
2016, Paraguay reported exports of 23.6 million ciga-
rettes to Switzerland, while Switzerland registered im-
ports of only 3% of that amount – with reported imports
of 766,076 cigarettes from Paraguay, a difference of al-
most 23 million cigarettes. During those same years,
Table 2 Cigarette trade between Paraguay and Tabesa’s named
markets overseas (2001–2016). Source: UN Comtrade, using
Iglesias et al. [48] conversion (1 kg = 956.4 cigarettes)
Trade
partners
Cigarette exports
reported by
Paraguay
Cigarette imports
reported by trade
partner
Discrepancies
(exports - imports)
Aruba 12,283,231,698 9,134,807,849 3,148,423,849
Curaçao 1,405,225,130 0 1,405,225,130
Netherlands
Antilles
481,190,663 0 481,190,663
Spain 386,069,988 126,320,356 259,749,632
US 2,278,224,181 2,140,187,926 138,036,255
Romania 177,520,273 55,297,135 122,223,138
Netherlands 111,413,905 0 111,413,905
UAE 76,915,601 27,680,129 49,235,472
Switzerland 23,633,600 766,076 22,867,524
Bulgaria 0 0 0
Mongolia 15,072,864 24,031,463 -8,958,599
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Paraguay registered exports of 111.4 million cigarettes to
the Netherlands. However, there is no record by the
Netherlands of any cigarette import from Paraguay.
Similarly, Paraguay registered exports of 1.4 billion ciga-
rettes to Curaçao, and 481.2 million cigarettes to the
Netherlands Antilles, but neither report equivalent im-
ports from Paraguay. The difference between official ex-
ports and imports during the same period amounted to
122.2 million cigarettes for Romania (where 68.9% of
Paraguay’s reported exports were unaccounted for),
259.8 million cigarettes for Spain (67.3%), 49.2 million
cigarettes for the UAE (64%), 3.1 billion cigarettes for
Aruba (25.6%), and 138 million cigarettes for the US
(6.1%). Aruba is a notable example given the country’s
small size of just over 100, 000 inhabitants and low
smoking prevalence rates of 16.2% for 25–64 year olds
[103]. Despite this, Paraguay reported exports of 12.3
billion cigarettes between 2001 and 2016 (767.7m ciga-
rettes on average per year). In 2001, 2002, 2013, and
2014, 2.6 million cigarettes were registered as exports
from Paraguay to Aruba (including 2.1 million in 2013
alone), but there were no registered imports by Aruba.
In Mongolia, an additional 9 million cigarettes were reg-
istered as imports. Finally, there is no official record of
any Paraguayan exports of tobacco products to Bulgaria
or any imports to Bulgaria from Paraguay between 2001
and 2016, despite Lopez Moreira listing the country as
an export destination of Tabesa’s cigarettes in his 2011
media interview.
In total, Paraguay reported exports of 17.2 billion ciga-
rettes to ten markets between 2001 and 2016, while
these markets reported imports of only 11.5 billion ciga-
rettes, leaving one-third of exports or 5.7 billion ciga-
rettes unaccounted for. These discrepancies suggest
significant diversion to the illicit market. Furthermore,
available data is likely to be an underestimation. As
noted above, evidence suggests large volumes of ciga-
rettes produced by Tabesa are smuggled to countries
where the company does not officially export to, primar-
ily Brazil as well as Argentina, Colombia, and Mexico
(Table 2).
Discussion
The above findings analyze the factors contributing to
Tabesa’s rapid growth since the mid-1990s, into a major
tobacco company in the region, and growing player glo-
bally. Leading TTCs had developed a substantial market
for illicit tobacco products in Brazil and Argentina be-
ginning in the 1960s. By the 1990s, their focus on
low-priced brands, coupled with the Brazilian export tax
of 1999, created a lucrative opportunity for Paraguayan
companies to manufacture and supply their own brands
to the illicit market. Tabesa was further enabled by a
regulatory environment in Paraguay that was permissive
and weakly governed. These findings of this paper sup-
port the conclusion by Joossens and Raw that, beyond
tax differentials, the illicit trade is due to “other import-
ant factors [including] the ease and cost of operating in
a country, industry participation, how well organized
crime networks are, the likelihood of being caught, the
punishment if caught, corruption levels” [8]. These fac-
tors appear to explain why a domestic tobacco company
in Paraguay rose to outperform traditional TTCs in the
sub-regional illicit market, and then aspire to pursue
markets globally. Using independent data sources, we
suggest Tabesa’s complicity in the illicit trade has ex-
tended from an initial focus on Latin America. Tabesa’s
global expansion was achieved by creating new low-
priced brands, improving quality, expanding manufac-
turing capacity, and then exporting its brands on a large
scale through legal and illegal channels. Legal exports to
the US, in addition have been used to enhance corporate
reputation and fend off allegations of illegal activity.
There are four main implications for strengthening to-
bacco control, in Paraguay and globally, arising from
these findings. First, the FCTC entered into force in
Paraguay on 25 December 2006, although the country
has yet to implement some of its key measures. Of par-
ticular relevance is Article 5.3, to protect tobacco con-
trol policies “from commercial and other vested
interests of the tobacco industry in accordance with na-
tional law” [104]. WHO guidelines on Article 5.3 imple-
mentation urges that “government institutions and their
bodies should not have any financial interest in the to-
bacco industry” [105]. On his first day in office, Cartes
stated he was willing to sell Tabesa: “if someone’s paying,
they can take my cigarette factory” [106]. In a 2016
interview, prompted by the publication of an article by
the current authors on Tabesa’s alleged role in the illicit
trade [20], CEO José Ortiz confirmed that Cartes
remained a major shareholder [107]. Beyond the FCTC,
this revelation has prompted questions under Article
237 of Paraguay’s Constitution which states: “The Presi-
dent of the Republic and the Vice President may not ex-
ercise public or private offices, remunerated or not,
while in their functions. They may neither exercise com-
mercial, industrial or any professional activity” [trans-
lated by the authors] [108]. At the time of writing,
whether holding shares in a company should be inter-
preted as such is yet to be determined under Paraguayan
domestic law. The findings of this paper suggest that the
close relationship between a Paraguayan political leader
and the tobacco industry is not conducive to a strong
regulatory environment for tobacco control including ef-
fective action on the illicit tobacco trade. It is recognised
here that tobacco control in Paraguay was relatively
weak, compared to other FCTC States Parties, before
Cartes’ election in 2013. Under Cartes, however, Tabesa
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officials became well-positioned to hinder stronger to-
bacco control, taxation, law enforcement, and other pol-
icy areas related to company interests via their direct
working relationship with the president and his cabinet
[109, 110]. Notably, FCTC Article 15 on the illicit trade
in tobacco products has yet to be implemented in
Paraguay. Authorities have not taken any significant
steps to “[determine] the point of diversion and monitor,
document and control the movement of tobacco prod-
ucts and their legal status”, “monitor and collect data on
cross-border trade in tobacco products, including illicit
trade”, “enact or strengthen legislation, with appropriate
penalties and remedies, against illicit trade in tobacco
products”, or “adopt measures as appropriate to enable
the confiscation of proceeds derived from the illicit trade
in tobacco products”, as the treaty stipulates.
Second, this paper highlights the importance for Paraguay
and neighbouring countries to sign, ratify, and implement
the WHO Protocol to Eliminate Illicit Trade in Tobacco
Products. If the Protocol were fully implemented, tobacco
company officials could no longer claim that, after selling
to distributors, they are not responsible for the onward il-
legal sale of their products. Under the traceability system of
the Protocol, detailed information on the whole supply
chain is required, including “the name, invoice, order num-
ber and payment records of the first customer not affiliated
to the manufacturer”, “the intended market of retail sale”,
“any warehousing and shipping”, “the identity of any known
subsequent purchaser”, and “the intended shipment route,
the shipment date, shipment destination, point of departure
and consignee” (Article 8.4.1). Article 10.1.b also stipulates
that Parties shall take the necessary measures so that com-
panies [supply] tobacco products or manufacturing equip-
ment in amounts commensurate with the demand for such
products within the intended market of retail sale or. This
would prevent Tabesa and other companies from flooding
small markets with cigarettes which are then diverted to
illicit trade channels. Our methodology for estimating
cigarette production finally shows the need to monitor and
control key inputs in cigarette manufacturing, including
tobacco leaf, cigarette paper, and acetate tow [7].
Third, the findings regarding Tabesa’s complicity in
the illicit tobacco trade, as a core part of its business
strategy, support the need for fuller understanding of the
growing risk to global health from aspiring TTCs. The
analytical framework of Lee and Eckhardt, within the
context of tobacco industry globalization, and the
methods and data sources used to estimate the scale of
the ITTP from Paraguay, have proven useful for this
purpose. As Lee and Eckhardt write, emerging TTCs will
bring “fiercer competition for market share, especially in
emerging markets”, likely leading to downward pressures
on price, product innovation and intensified marketing
[5]. This, in turn, will encourage increased consumption
of products responsible for 7 million deaths annually by
2017 [111]. The findings also suggest links between as-
piring TTCs, the illicit trade and organized crime [79–
81]. As Joossens and Raw describe, organized crime is
an important part of a global supply chain of harmful
illicit substances including tobacco [8]. Further research
to deepen understanding of the intertwined nature of
the legal and illegal tobacco trade, the actors involved,
and the transnational networks sustaining their activ-
ities, would benefit from integrating analytical frame-
works from business studies and criminology.
Finally, this analysis of Paraguay points to the need for
independent data and other resources to effectively imple-
ment the FCTC Protocol. BAT and PMI have commis-
sioned several studies on the illicit tobacco trade in Latin
America and Tabesa’s role in it [112, 113], and have
framed the issue in the regional media to focus on Tabesa
[114–116]. In turn, close relationship between the Cartes
administration and tobacco industry between 2013-2018
cast doubt on Paraguyan government statements and fig-
ures on the illicit tobacco trade from Paraguay. As WHO
cautions, “the involvement of organizations or individuals
with commercial or vested interests in the tobacco indus-
try in public health policies with respect to tobacco con-
trol is most likely to have a negative effect” [105].
Conclusion
Tabesa represents an emerging threat to global health as
a tobacco company expanding its markets worldwide,
largely through the illegal trade of low-priced cheap
brands. The continuing expansion of Tabesa is part of
ongoing tobacco industry globalization which has seen a
growing role for aspiring TTCs in some countries. While
attention to the global business strategies of leading
TTCs remains critical to global tobacco control, how
non-TTCs may be working in cooperation and/or com-
petition with TTCs requires fuller analysis. Since the
1960s, Paraguay has moved from a key hub for illicit
trade of TTC brands within the subregion, to a major
source of illicit tobacco products worldwide, led by the
growth of Tabesa. Effective implementation of the FCTC
and its Protocol will require fuller understanding of the
dynamic and complex nature of the illicit tobacco trade
worldwide, including improved data on the activities of
such non-TTCs.
Endnotes
1The Netherlands Antilles, whose islands included
Curaçao, were part of the Netherlands until October
2010. The UN Comtrade website notes that data for the
Netherlands does not include these islands. https://
comtrade.un.org/ITSY2016VolI.pdf.
2We chose the UAE because of Cartes’ reference to
an ‘Arab country’ in a media interview. Euromonitor
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International notes that the UAE’s Jebel Ali Free Zone
(JAF) is “increasingly central to the trade in cheap
whites”, acting “as a production centre…[and] re-
consignment hub for illicit white brands manufactured
in Europe, Asia and Paraguay.” See Euromonitor Inter-
national. Trends in illicit trade. Tobacco Journal Inter-
national. 29 April 2015.
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